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Abstract
We present a framework for expressing various merging operators for belief sets. This framework generalises our earlier work
on consistency-based belief revision and contraction. Two primary merging operators are identified: in the first approach, belief
sources are consistently combined so that the result of merging knowledge bases K1, . . . ,Kn is a maximal consistent (if possible)
set of formulas comprising the joint knowledge of the knowledge bases. This approach then accords with one’s intuitions as to
what a “merge” operator should do. The second approach is more akin to a generalised belief revision operator. Knowledge bases
K1, . . . ,Kn are “projected” onto another (in the simplest case the knowledge base where only tautologies are known). Properties
of these operators are investigated, primarily by comparing their properties with postulates that have been identified previously
in the literature. Notably, the approach is independent of syntax, in that merging knowledge bases K1, . . . ,Kn is independent of
how each Ki is expressed. As well, we investigate the role of entailment-based and consistency-based integrity constraints, the
interrelationships between these approaches and belief revision, and the expression of further merging operators.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The problem of merging multiple, potentially conflicting bodies of information arises in various guises. For ex-
ample, an intelligent agent may receive reports from differing sources of knowledge that must be combined. As well,
an agent may receive conflicting information from sensors that needs to be reconciled. Alternately, knowledge bases
or databases comprising collections of data may need to be combined into a coherent whole. Even in dealing with a
single, isolated, agent the problem of merging knowledge sets may arise: consider an agent whose beliefs are mod-
elled by various independent “states of mind”, but where it is desirable in some circumstances to combine such states
of mind into a coherent whole, for example, before acting in a crucial situation. In all these cases, the fundamental
problem is that of combining knowledge bases that may be mutually inconsistent, or conflicting, to get a coherent
merged set of beliefs.
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have arisen for combining sources of information. The major subtypes of merging that have been proposed are called
(following [14]) majority and arbitration operators. In the former case, the majority opinion counts towards resolving
conflicts; in the latter, informally, the idea is to try to arrive at some consensus. In this paper, we develop a specific
framework for defining merge operations. This framework extends our earlier work in belief revision. In both cases,
the central intuition is that for belief change one begins by expressing the various knowledge bases, belief sources,
etc. in distinct languages, and then (according to the belief change operation) in one way or another re-express the
knowledge bases in a common language. Two approaches are first presented. In the first case, the intuition is that for
merging knowledge bases, the common information is in a sense “pooled”. This approach then seems to conform more
naturally to the commonsense notion of merging of knowledge. A key property of this approach is that knowledge
common to the knowledge bases is contained in the merged knowledge base. Thus if one knowledge base contained
p∧q and another ¬p∧¬q , then (p∧q)∨(¬p∧¬q) would be in the merged knowledge base. Hence in this approach
to merging, an intuition underlying the merging operation is that (at least) one of the knowledge bases contains correct
information, but it is not known which.
In a second approach, knowledge bases are projected onto a separate knowledge base (which in the simplest case
would consist solely of the set of tautologies). That is, the knowledge bases we wish to merge are used to augment
the knowledge of a “target” body of knowledge. This second approach then appears to be a natural extension of belief
revision. In this approach, knowledge common to the knowledge bases may not be contained in the merged knowledge
base. Thus if two knowledge bases contained p ∧ q and ¬p ∧¬q , respectively, then (p ∧ q)∨ (¬p ∧¬q) may not be
in the merged knowledge base; for example p ∧ ¬q may be consistent with the merged knowledge base. Hence, here
an intuition underlying the merging operation is that perhaps some “common ground” is found between the merged
knowledge bases.
In both approaches, we address the role of entailment-based and consistency-based integrity constraints with re-
spect to the merge operators. Both approaches have reasonable properties, compared with postulate sets that have
appeared in the literature. As well, the second type of approach has not, to our knowledge, been investigated previ-
ously. The next section describes related work while Section 3 develops these approaches. Following this, we consider
variants on these approaches, including prioritised merging. Section 5 briefly considers computational complexity. We
conclude with a discussion. Proofs of theorems are found in Appendix A.
2. Background
2.1. Consistency-based belief revision
This subsection summarises our earlier work [6] on consistency-based belief revision. Throughout this paper, we
deal with propositional languages and use the logical symbols , ⊥, ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃, and ≡ to construct formulas in the
standard way. We write LP to denote a language over an alphabet P of propositional letters or atomic propositions.
Formulas are denoted by the Greek letters α,β,α1, . . . . Knowledge bases are identified with deductively-closed sets
of formulas, or belief sets, and are denoted K,K1, . . . .2 Thus K = Cn(K), where Cn(·) is the deductive closure in
classical propositional logic of the formula or set of formulas given as argument. Given an alphabet P , we define
a disjoint alphabet P ′ as P ′ = {p′ | p ∈ P}. For α ∈ LP , α′ is the result of replacing in α each proposition p ∈ P
by the corresponding proposition p′ ∈ P ′ (so implicitly there is an isomorphism between P and P ′, and thus LP
and LP ′ ). This is defined analogously for sets of formulas. This notation essentially allows us to refer to a formula or
set of formulas relative to a knowledge base. In turn, this means that we can rely on the fact that, while p and ¬p are
mutually contradictory, p and ¬p′, trivially, are not.
A belief change scenario inLP is a triple B = (K,R,C) where K , R, and C are sets of formulas in LP . Informally,
K is a belief set that is to be modified so that the formulas in R are contained in the result, and the formulas in C are
not. For an approach to revision we have |R| = 1 and C = ∅, and for an approach to contraction we have R = ∅ and
|C| = 1. An extension determined by a belief change scenario, called a belief change extension, is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. Let B = (K,R,C) be a belief change scenario in LP .
2 We note that while we deal solely with belief sets in this paper, our definitions work for arbitrary sets of formulas.
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Cn(K ′ ∪ R ∪ EQ) ∩ (C ∪ {⊥})= ∅.
Then Cn(K ′ ∪ R ∪ EQ) ∩LP is a (consistent) belief change extension of B .
If there is no such set EQ then B is inconsistent and LP is defined to be the sole (inconsistent) belief change
extension of B .
Note that in the definition, “maximal” is with respect to set containment (rather than set cardinality). The exclusive
use of “{⊥}” in the definition is to take care of consistency if C = ∅. Clearly a consistent belief change extension of
B is a modification of K which contains every formula in R, and which contains no formula in C. We say that EQ
determines the respective consistent belief change extension of B . For a given belief change scenario there may be
more than one consistent belief change extension. We make use of the notion of a selection function c that for any
set I = ∅ has as value some element of I . In defining revision, we use such a selection function to select a specific
consistent belief change extension.3
Definition 2.1 provides a very general framework for specifying belief change. We can restrict the definition to
obtain specific functions for belief revision and contraction; here we just deal with revision.
Definition 2.2 (Revision). Let K be a belief set and α a formula, and let (Ei)i∈I be the family of all belief change
extensions of (K, {α},∅). Then, we define
1. K +˙c α = Ei as a choice revision of K by α with respect to some selection function c with c(I ) = i.
2. K +˙ α =⋂i∈I Ei as the (skeptical) revision of K by α.
For instance, (skeptically) revising Cn(p ∧ q) by ¬q results in Cn(p ∧ ¬q). This belief change extension is de-
termined by {p ≡ p′} from the renamed belief set {p′ ∧ q ′} and the revision formula ¬q . As a second example, we
get
{¬p ≡ q} +˙ ¬q = Cn(p ∧ ¬q)
from the renamed knowledge base ¬p′ ≡ q ′ and formula ¬q , along with equivalences {p ≡ p′, q ≡ q ′}. For a third
example, observe that both {p ∨ q} +˙ (¬p ∨¬q) as well as {p ∧ q} +˙ (¬p ∨¬q) result in Cn(p ≡ ¬q), although the
former is determined by {p ≡ p′, q ≡ q ′}, while the latter relies on two such sets, viz. {p ≡ p′} and {q ≡ q ′}.
With respect to related work, and specifically to the foundational AGM postulates [10], we obtain that the basic
postulates are satisfied, along with supplementary postulate (K +˙ 7) for both choice and skeptical revision.
Definition 2.1 also leads to a natural and general treatment of both consistency-based and entailment-based integrity
constraints; see [6] for details.
2.2. Belief merging
In this section we review related work in belief set merging. We focus on two sets of postulates that have been used
to characterise merging, and with respect to which we compare our own approaches. Following this we briefly survey
representative related work in the literature.
First, Liberatore and Schaerf [18] consider merging two belief bases and propose the following postulate set to
characterise a merge operator that they call an arbitration operator ([15] call this a commutative revision operator).
They restrict their attention to propositional languages over a finite set of atoms; consequently their merging operator
can be expressed as a binary operator on formulas. They provide the following postulates, which we express as a
definition.
Definition 2.3.  is an arbitration operator (or commutative revision operator) iff  satisfies the following postulates.
3 This use of selection functions is slightly different from that in the AGM approach.
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(LS2)  α ∧ β ⊃ α  β .
(LS3) If α ∧ β is satisfiable then  α  β ⊃ α ∧ β .
(LS4) α  β is unsatisfiable iff α is unsatisfiable and β is unsatisfiable.
(LS5) If  α1 ≡ α2 and  β1 ≡ β2 then  α1  β1 ≡ α2  β2.
(LS6)
α  (β1 ∨ β2) =
⎧⎨
⎩
α  β1 or
α  β2 or
(α  β1) ∨ (α  β2)
(LS7)  (α  β) ⊃ (α ∨ β).
(LS8) If α is satisfiable then α ∧ (α  β) is satisfiable.
The first postulate asserts that the merging is a commutative operator, while the next two assert that, for mutually
consistent formulas, merging corresponds to their conjunction. (LS5) ensures that the operator is independent of
syntax, while (LS6) provides a “factoring” postulate, analogous to a similar factoring result in (AGM-style) belief
revision and contraction. Postulate (LS7) can be taken as distinguishing  from other such operators; it asserts that
the result of merging implies the disjunction of the original formulas. The last postulate informally constrains the
result of merging so that each operator “contributes to” (i.e. is consistent with) the final result.
Konieczny and Pino Peréz [15] also consider the problem of merging possibly contradictory belief bases. To this
end, they consider finite multisets of the form Ψ = {K1, . . . ,Kn} and assume that all belief sets Ki are consistent,
finitely representable, and therefore representable by a formula. K+n is the multiset consisting of n copies of K .4
Multiset union is denoted unionsq, wherein for example {φ} unionsq {φ} = {φ,φ}. Following [15], we use5 μ(Ψ ) to denote the
result of merging the multi-set Ψ of belief bases given the entailment-based integrity constraint expressed by μ. They
provide the following set of postulates:
Definition 2.4. [15] Let Ψ be a multiset of sets of formulas, and φ, μ formulas (all possibly subscripted or primed).
 is an IC merging operator iff it satisfies the following postulates.
(IC0) μ(Ψ )  μ.
(IC1) If μ ⊥ then μ(Ψ ) ⊥.
(IC2) If
∧
Ψ ¬μ then μ(Ψ ) ≡∧Ψ ∧ μ.
(IC3) If Ψ1 ≡ Ψ2 and μ1 ≡ μ2 then μ1(Ψ1) ≡ μ2(Ψ2).
(IC4) If φ  μ and φ′  μ then: μ(φ unionsq φ′) ∧ φ ⊥ implies μ(φ unionsq φ′) ∧ φ′ ⊥.
(IC5) μ(Ψ1) ∧ μ(Ψ2)  μ(Ψ1 unionsq Ψ2).
(IC6) If μ(Ψ1) ∧ μ(Ψ2) ⊥ then μ(Ψ1 unionsq Ψ2)  μ(Ψ1) ∧ μ(Ψ2).
(IC7) μ1(Ψ ) ∧ μ2  μ1∧μ2(Ψ ).
(IC8) If μ1(Ψ ) ∧ μ2 ⊥ then μ1∧μ2(Ψ )  μ1(Ψ ) ∧ μ2.
The intent is that μ(Ψ ) is the belief base closest to the belief multiset Ψ . Of the postulates, (IC2) states that
the result of merging is simply the conjunction of the belief bases and integrity constraints, when consistent. (IC4)
is a fairness postulate, that when two belief bases disagree, merging doesn’t give preference to one of them. (IC5)
states that a model of two mergings is in the union of their merging. With (IC5) we get that if two mergings are
consistent then their merging is implied by their conjunction. Note that merging operators are trivially commutative.
(IC7) and (IC8) correspond to the extended AGM postulates (K +˙ 7) and (K +˙ 8) for revision, but with respect to
the integrity constraints. Postulates (IC1)–(IC6), with tautologous integrity constraints, correspond to basic merging
without integrity constraints in [14].
A majority operator is characterised in addition by the postulate:
4 [15] uses the notation Kn .
5 [15] writes μ(Ψ ) where we have μ(Ψ ).
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Thus, given enough repetitions of a belief base Ψ2, this belief base will eventually come to dominate the merge
operation.
An arbitration operator is characterised by the original postulates together with the following postulate; see [15]
for an explanation.
(Arb) Let μ1 and μ2 be logically independent. If μ1(φ1) ≡ μ2(φ2) and μ1≡μ2(φ1 unionsq φ2) ≡ (μ1 ≡ μ2) then
μ1∨μ2(φ1 unionsq φ2) ≡ μ1(φ1).
[14] characterises these approaches as trying to minimize global dissatisfaction vs. trying to minimize local dissatis-
faction, respectively. Examples are given of a merging operator using Dalal’s notion of distance [5].
Earlier work on merging operators includes [1,22]. The former proposes various theory merging operators based
on the selection of maximum consistent subsets in the union of the belief bases; see [12] for a pertinent discussion.
The latter proposes an “arbitration” operator that satisfies a subset of the Liberatore and Schaerf postulates; see [17]
for a discussion. [19] first identified and addressed the majority merge operator. [13] gives a framework for defining
merging operators, where a family of merging operators is parameterised by a distance between interpretations and
aggregating functions. The authors suggest that most, if not all, model-based merging operators can be captured in
their approach, along with a selection of syntax-based operators.
More or less concurrently, [20] proposed a general approach to formulating merging functions, based on ordinal
conditional functions [24]. Roughly, epistemic states are associated with a mapping from possible worlds onto the set
of ordinal numbers. Various merging operators then can be defined by considering the ways in which the “Cartesian
product” of two epistemic states can be resolved into an ordinal conditional function. [3] also considers the problem
of an agent merging information from different sources, via what is called social contraction. In a manner analogous
to the Levi Identity for belief revision, information from the various sources is weakened to the extent that it can be
consistently added to the agent’s belief base. Last, much work has been carried out in merging possibilistic knowledge
bases; see for example [2].
3. Consistency-based approaches to belief set merging
In this section we modify the framework given by Definition 2.1 to deal with belief set merging, in which multiple
sources of information (knowledge bases, etc.) are coalesced into a single belief set. We detail two different approaches
to belief set merging in this section, expressible in the general approach.
In the first case, the intuition is that for merging belief sets, the common information is in a sense “pooled”. This
approach then seems to conform to the commonsense notion of merging of knowledge, in which sets of knowledge
are joined to produce a single knowledge set retaining as much as possible of the contents of the original knowledge
sets. As well, it adheres for the most part to the Liberatore and Schaerf postulates [18]. In the second approach,
knowledge sources are projected onto a separate knowledge source (which in the simplest case could consist solely of
tautologies). That is, the sources we wish to merge are used to augment the knowledge of another source, which could
be thought of as a set of integrity constraints or alternatively as a set of formulas for revision. This approach generally
follows the postulates given by Konieczny and Pino Peréz [15].
3.1. Multi belief change scenarios
Our approaches to merging are centred around the notion of a multi belief change scenario:
Definition 3.1. A multi belief change scenario, B , in LP is a triple
B = (K,R,C),
where K is a family (Kj )j∈J of sets of formulas in LP , and R,C ⊆ LP .
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result, and the formulas in C are not. So this is the same as a belief change scenario as defined in Section 2, except
that the single set of formulas K is extended to several of sets of formulas. R and C will be used to express entailment-
based and consistency-based integrity constraints, respectively. That is, the formulas in R will all be true in the result
of a merging, whereas the formulas in C will not be contained in the result. While R is intended to represent a set
of entailment-based integrity constraints [21], it could just as easily be regarded as a set of formulas for revision.
Similarly, while C is intended to represent a set of (negations of) consistency-based integrity constraints [16,23], it
could just as easily be regarded as a set of formulas for contraction. Thus the overall approaches can be considered as
a framework in which merging, revising, and (multiple) contractions may be carried out in parallel while taking into
account integrity constraints.
To begin with, we generalise the notation α′ from Section 2 in the obvious way for integers i > 0 and sets of
integers: for alphabet P , we define P i as P i = {pi | p ∈ P}, and αi etc. analogous to Section 2. Similarly we define
for a set or list of positive integers N that PN = {pi | p ∈ P, i ∈ N}. Then αN = {αi | i ∈ N}. The definition of an
extension to a multi belief change scenario will depend on the specific approach to merging that is being formalised.
We consider each approach in turn in the following two subsections.
3.2. Belief set merging
Consider the first approach, in which the contents of belief sets are to be merged. The issue of integrity constraints
is addressed after the basic definitions are given.
Definition 3.2. Let B = (K,∅,∅) be a multi belief change scenario in LP , where K = (Kj )j∈J . Define EQ as a
maximal set of equivalences
EQ ⊆ {pk ≡ pl | p ∈ P and k, l ∈ J}
such that
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ EQ
)
∩ {⊥} = ∅.
Then {
α | {αj | j ∈ J}⊆ Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ EQ
)}
is a consistent symmetric belief change extension of B .
If there is no such set EQ then B is inconsistent and LP is defined to be the sole (inconsistent) symmetric belief
change extension of B .
Definition 3.3 (Merging). Let K be a family of sets of formulas in LP and let (Ei)i∈I be the family of all symmetric
belief change extensions of (K,∅,∅).
Then, we define
1. c(K) = Ei as the choice merging of K with respect to selection function c with c(I ) = i.
2. (K) =⋂i∈I Ei as the (skeptical) merging of K.
Of particular interest is binary merging, where K= {K1,K2}. In this case, we will write the merge operator  as
an infix operator. That is, ({K1,K2}) is written as K1 K2. Also, given two formulas α, β , we just write α  β .
Example 1. (p∧q∧r) (p∧¬q∧s) yields (informally) (p1 ∧q1 ∧r1)∧(p2 ∧¬q2 ∧s2) along with EQ = {p1 ≡ p2,
r1 ≡ r2, s1 ≡ s2}. The result of merging is Cn({p ∧ r ∧ s}).
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K1 ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ s and K2 ≡ ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬s.
We obtain that K1 K2 yields EQ = ∅ and in fact
K1 K2 = Cn
({
(p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ s) ∨ (¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬s)}).
This example is introduced and discussed in [14]; as well it corresponds to the postulate (LS7). Consider where K1
and K2 represent two analyst’s forecasts concerning how four different stocks are going to perform. p represents the
fact that the first stock will rise, etc. The result of merging is a belief set, in which it is believed that either all will rise,
or that all will not rise. That is, essentially, it is believed that one forecast will hold in its entirety, or the other will. As
[14] points out, knowing nothing else and assuming independence of the stock’s movements, this is implausible: it is
possible that some stocks rise while others do not. On the other hand, if we have reason to believe that one analyst
is in fact highly reliable (although we do not know which) then the result of Example 2 is reasonable. However this
example illustrates that there are cases wherein this formulation is too strong.
We obtain the following with respect to the postulate sets described in Section 2.2.6
Theorem 3.1. Let  and c be defined as in Definition 3.3, but letting μ, μ1, and μ2 be .7
Then  and c satisfy the postulates (IC0), (IC2), (IC3),(IC5), (IC7), (IC8), as well as the weaker versions of
(IC1)8 and (IC6), and a stronger version of (IC4):
(IC1′) If K ⊥ for every K ∈K, then (K) ⊥.
(IC4′) If K ⊥ for every K ∈K, then for K ∈K we have (K) ∪ K ⊥.
(IC6′) If K1 ∧ K2 ⊥ then ({K1} unionsq {K2})  K1 ∧ K2.
A counterexample to (IC6) is given by
K1 =
{
Cn(p),Cn(¬p)}, K2 = {Cn(p)}.
We have (K1) ∧ (K2) ≡  ∧ p ≡ p, while (K1 unionsqK2) ≡ . The fact that this approach fails to satisfy (IC6) as
originally given seems reasonable to us, at least in the context of a non-majority merging operator. Indeed, it proves
to be the case that present approach satisfies a non-majority postulate, viz.:

(K1 unionsqK+n2 )= (K1 unionsqK2).
This postulate is identified in [14], a weaker version of which is used to define their arbitration operator.
Theorem 3.2. Let  and c be defined as in Definition 3.3.
Then  and c satisfy the following postulates.
(1) (LS1), (LS2), (LS3), (LS5), (LS7)
as well as the following weaker versions of the remaining postulates:
(2) (LS4)′ α  β is satisfiable iff α is satisfiable and β is satisfiable.
(LS6)′ (α  β1) ∧ β2 implies α  (β1 ∧ β2).
(LS8)′ If α is satisfiable and β is satisfiable then α ∧ (α  β) is satisfiable.
6 In discussing the IC postulates we will use the notation of [14]; for the LS postulates we will use the notation of [18].
7 Setting μ, μ1, and μ2 to  reflects the fact that in Definition 3.1 we have R = C = ∅. For more explanation, see the discussion on integrity
constraints following Theorem 3.3.
8 It is straightforward to obtain (IC1) by essentially ignoring inconsistent belief sets. We remain with the present postulate since it reflects the
most natural formulation of merging in our framework.
466 J.P. Delgrande, T. Schaub / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 459–477(3) (LS6c)′ For any selection function c there is a selection function c′ such that α c β1 implies α c′ (β1 ∨ β2) or
α c β2 implies α c′ (β1 ∨ β2).
Example 3. A counterexample to (LS6) is given by the following.
α ≡ (p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ s), β1 ≡ (¬p ∧ ¬q) ∨ ¬r, β2 ≡ ¬q ∨ ¬s.
We get that:
α  (β1 ∨ β2) ≡ (p ∧ q ∧ r) ∨ (p ∧ q ∧ s) ∨ (p ∧ r ∧ s),
α  β1 ≡ (p ∧ q ∧ s) ∨ (r ∧ s),
α  β2 ≡ (p ∧ q ∧ r) ∨ (p ∧ r ∧ s).
This result echoes similar results in distance-based belief revision. Typically, AGM revision postulate (K +˙8) fails
in such distance-based approaches [11]. Here, (LS6)′ corresponds to AGM revision postulate (K +˙ 7), while (LS6) is
analogous to a “factoring result” in revision that in turn is equivalent to (K +˙ 7) and (K +˙ 8).
While the merging operator is commutative by definition, it is not associative; for example (((p ∨ q)  ¬p) 
p) = (p ∨ q) (¬p  p). Lastly, we have the following result showing that in this approach, merging two belief sets
is expressible in terms of our approach to revision.
Theorem 3.3. Let +˙ and  be given as in Definitions 2.2 and 3.3 (respectively). Then,
α  β = α +˙ β ∩ β +˙ α.
As in [6], we can also consider the role of integrity constraints in belief set merging. However there is a fundamental
problem here: given the presence of postulate (LS7), for (entailment-based) integrity constraint μ and merge operation
α  β , it is unclear what the result should be when α ∨ β  ¬μ. The simplest solution is to simply have the result
of merging be the inconsistent belief set when this occurs. Hence in [7] we had the following definition, in place of
Definition 3.2. (Other definitions are unchanged.)
Definition 3.4. Let B = (K,R,C) be a multi belief change scenario in LP , where K = (Kj )j∈J . Define EQ as a
maximal set of equivalences
EQ ⊆ {pk ≡ pl | p ∈ P and k, l ∈ J}
such that
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ RJ ∪ EQ
)
∩ (CJ ∪ {⊥})= ∅.
Then {
α | {αj | j ∈ J}⊆ Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ RJ ∪ EQ
)}
is a consistent symmetric belief change extension of B with integrity constraints.
If there is no such set EQ then B is inconsistent and LP is defined to be the sole (inconsistent) symmetric belief
change extension of B .
The sets RJ ensure that the integrity constraints in R are true in each belief set, and so will be true in the result. Of
course, this may come at the cost of inconsistency for the merged belief set.
Otherwise there are two ways that one can ensure that the result of merging is consistent with an (entailment-based)
integrity constraint: For multiset K and integrity constraint μ, one can ensure that each belief set in K is consistent
with μ by revising by μ. Alternatively, one can merge the members of K and then revise by μ. Thus in the first case
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
(
(Kj +˙ μ)j∈J
)
.
In the second case we define the merging as
(
(Kj )j∈J
) +˙ μ.
These approaches are not equivalent, as the next example illustrates.
Example 4. Let K1 = Cn(p), K2 = Cn(p ⊃ q), and μ = ¬p ∨ ¬q .
Then K1 K2 = Cn(p ∧ q) and (K1 K2) +˙ μ = Cn(p ≡ ¬q).
However, K1 +˙ μ = Cn(p ∧ ¬q), K2 +˙ μ = Cn(¬p), and
(K1 +˙ μ) (K2 +˙ μ) = Cn(¬q).
This example also shows that neither possibility is strictly stronger than the other.
3.3. Belief set projection
In our second approach, the contents of several belief sets are “projected” onto another designated belief set. Again,
the formulation is straightforward within the framework of belief change scenarios. For belief sets K1, . . . ,Kn, we
express each in a distinct language, but project these belief sets onto a distinguished belief set in which R is believed.
(In the simplest case we would have R ≡ .)
In the following, R and C represent a set of entailment-based and consistency-based integrity constraints, respec-
tively.
Definition 3.5. Let B = (K,R,C) be a multi belief change scenario in LP , where K = (Kj )j∈J . Define EQ as a
maximal set of equivalences
EQ ⊆ {pj ≡ p | p ∈P and j ∈ J}
such that
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ R ∪ EQ
)
∩ (C ∪ {⊥})= ∅.
Then
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ R ∪ EQ
)
∩LP
is a consistent projected belief change extension of B .
If there is no such set EQ then B is inconsistent and LP is defined to be the sole (inconsistent) projected belief
change extension of B .
There is an interesting similarity between revision and projection. Revision in some sense “projects” a belief set
onto the formula that we revise with. Similarly, the actual projection operation “projects” a family of belief sets onto
whatever is contained in R.
Definition 3.6 (Merging via projection). Let K be a family of sets of formulas in LP , let R and C be sets of formulas
in LP , and let (Ei)i∈I be the family of all projected belief change extensions of (K,R,C).
Then, we define
1. ∇R,Cc (K) = Ei as the choice merging of K with respect to integrity constraints R and C, and selection function c
with c(I ) = i.
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As above, for two formulas α and β , we just write αβ , if R = C = ∅ and we write αμβ if R = {μ} and C = ∅.
Example 5. We have that (p ∧ q ∧ r)(p ∧ ¬q) yields two EQ sets:
EQ1 =
{
p1 ≡ p,p2 ≡ p,q1 ≡ q, r1 ≡ r, r2 ≡ r} and
EQ2 =
{
p1 ≡ p,p2 ≡ p,q2 ≡ q, r1 ≡ r, r2 ≡ r}.
The result of merging is p ∧ r ∧ s.
Example 6. Consider the example from [14]:
K1 ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ s and K2 ≡ ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬s.
In forming a set of equivalences, EQ, we can have precisely one of p1 ≡ p or p2 ≡ p in EQ, and similarly for the other
atomic sentences. Each such set of equivalences then represents one way each forecaster’s prediction for a specific
stock can be taken into account. Taken all together then we have 24 sets of equivalences, and in the end we obtain that
K1K2 = Cn().
We feel that this is a plausible outcome in the interpretation involving the forecasted movement of independent
stocks. Note that if the example were extended so that multiple possibilities for stock movement were allowed, then
we would obtain in the projection the various compromise positions for the two belief sets. Thus, for example, if a
stock could either remain the same, or go up or down a little or a lot, and one forecaster predicted that stocks a and
b would go up a lot, and another predicted that they would both go down a lot, then the projection would have both
stocks moving a lot, although it would be unclear as to whether the movement would be up or down.
We obtain the following.
Theorem 3.4. Let ∇ and ∇c be defined as in Definition 3.6.
Then ∇ and ∇c satisfy the postulates (IC0), (IC2), (IC3), (IC5), (IC7), (IC8), as well as versions of (IC1), (IC4),
(IC6):
(IC1′) If for every K ∈K we have K ⊥, and μ ⊥ then ∇μ(K) ⊥.9
(IC4′) If K1 ⊥, K2 ⊥ and K1  μ, K2  μ then: ∇μ({K1} unionsq {K2}) ∧ K1 ⊥.
(IC6′) If K1 ∧ K2 ⊥ then ∇({K1} unionsq {K2})  K1 ∧ K2.
Theorem 3.5. Let ∇ and ∇c be defined as in Definition 3.6.
Then, ∇ and ∇c satisfy the postulates (LS1)–(LS3), (LS5), along with:
(LS4)′ αβ is satisfiable iff α is satisfiable and β is satisfiable.
(LS8)′ If α is satisfiable and β is satisfiable then α ∧ (αβ) is satisfiable.
As well, versions for c for (LS4)′ and (LS8)′ also hold.
Postulate (LS6) does not hold here; Example 3 provides a counterexample. As well, the weaker postulate (LS6)′
does not hold. Recall that (LS6)′ is (α  β1) ∧ β2 implies α  (β1 ∧ β2). However, consider the counterexample,
derived from the stock-moving Example 2:
[
(p ∧ q) (¬p ∧ ¬q)]∧ (p ∧ ¬q)
9 It is straightforward to obtain (IC1) by essentially ignoring inconsistent belief sets. We remain with the present postulate since it reflects the
most natural formulation of projection in our framework.
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(p ∧ q) [(¬p ∧ ¬q) ∧ (p ∧ ¬q)].
Further, postulate (LS7) does not hold here, as Example 6 illustrates. Hence, projection is not an arbitration operator
(in the sense of [18]). Neither is the projection operator associative, as the example from the previous subsection, viz.
(((p ∨ q)¬p)p) = (p ∨ q)(¬pp), shows.
Last we have the following results relating projection with merging and revision, respectively:
Theorem 3.6. Let K,  and ∇ be given as in Definitions 3.3 and 3.6 (respectively). Then
∇(K) ⊆ (K).
That is, in binary terms, α  β ⊆ α  β .
As well, we have the following analogue to Theorem 3.3:
Theorem 3.7. Let +˙ and ∇ be given as in Definitions 2.2 and 3.6 (respectively).
Then, α +˙ β = α β .
3.4. Combining the approaches
In this section we show an interesting relationship between belief set merging and projection. Consider the belief
multiset {R} unionsq {K1, . . . ,Kn}. One can define a new type of merging operation in which {K1, . . . ,Kn} are merged
(as in Definition 3.3) while simultaneously being projected onto R (as in Definition 3.6). Of course, this is just the
merging of {R,K1, . . . ,Kn} (according to Definition 3.2), where instead of taking formulas common to all belief
sets, as in Definition 3.3, one just selects those formulas in (the language of) R. This approach then would appear to
provide a means of incorporating integrity constraints in belief set merging, in which the belief set R would represent
(entailment-based) integrity constraints. However, as will be seen, this enhanced approach adds nothing over what we
already have with belief set projection.
Formally we have the following. First, we have the definition, extending Definition 3.2:
Definition 3.7. Let B = (K,R,C) be a multi belief change scenario in LP , where K = (Kj )j∈J . Define EQ as a
maximal set of equivalences
EQ ⊆ {pk ≡ pl | p ∈P and k, l ∈ J}∪ {pj ≡ p | p ∈P and j ∈ J}
such that
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ R ∪ EQ
)
∩ (C ∪ {⊥})= ∅.
Then
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ R ∪ EQ
)
∩LP
is a consistent merge/project belief change extension of B .
If there is no such set EQ then B is inconsistent and LP is defined to be the sole (inconsistent) symmetric belief
change extension of B .
We could then go on and define choice and skeptical versions of this operator, as we did for merging and projection.
However the following result shows that this is not necessary.
Theorem 3.8. Let B = (K,R,∅) be a multi belief change scenario in LP .
Then E is a consistent projected belief change extension of B (according to Definition 3.5) iff E is a consistent
merge/project belief change extension of B (according to Definition 3.7).
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of B . This in turn means that our purported combining of merging and projection in fact amounts to projection.
Expressed differently we have that, in projecting onto R, allowing interactions among the members of K is in fact
irrelevant with respect to the projection.
4. Additional merging operators
In this section we outline further types of merging operators. Our results here are less formal than in the previous
section, partly because we modify or augment earlier definitions, and partly because the extensions we describe are
relatively straightforward. Nonetheless, the operators described here illustrate the range of possibilities that may be
covered in the overall approach.
4.1. Rigid merging
More skeptical versions of merging and projection, respectively, can be obtained by introducing some “rigidity”
into the definition of merging operators by modifying the format of the sets of equivalences EQ determining belief
change extensions.
As regards Definition 3.2, we may replace EQ ⊆ {pk ≡ pl | p ∈P and k, l ∈ J } by
(1)EQ ⊆
{ ∧
k,l∈J
(
pk ≡ pl) | p ∈P
}
or even restricted to n-ary conjunctions by
EQ ⊆
{∧
k,l∈I
(
pk ≡ pl) | p ∈ P and I ⊆ J, |I | = n
}
.
The result however in general is a quite weak operator. Consider for example where we have
K1 = Cn(p ∧ ¬q), K2 = Cn(q ∧ ¬r), K3 = Cn(r ∧ ¬p).
Then redefining EQ as in (1) we obtain that ({K1,K2,K3}) = Cn(). Plausibly however one might expect that
({K1,K2,K3}) would contain p ∨ q ∨ r as well as ¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r .
More interesting arguably is belief set projection, since the “rigidity” provides us with an additional means for
controlling projection. As regards Definition 3.5, we can replace EQ ⊆ {pj ≡ p | p ∈P and j ∈ J } with
EQ ⊆
{∧
j∈J
(
pj ≡ p) | p ∈ P
}
or even restricted to n-ary conjunctions by
(2)EQ ⊆
{∧
j∈I
(
pj ≡ p) | p ∈P and I ⊆ J, |I | = n
}
.
As an example, consider four knowledge bases
K1 ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r,
K2 ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r,
K3 ≡ p ∧ q ∧ ¬r,
K4 ≡ p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r.
Now, let us merge these bases by using the type of equivalences in (2) and setting n = 3. That is, we only consider
conjunctions of three equivalences, like (q2 ≡ q)∧ (q3 ≡ q)∧ (q4 ≡ q). Starting from K11 ∪K22 ∪K33 ∪K44 , we may
clearly add all ternary equivalences involving p. Regarding q , however, only the above conjunction can be added, and
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previous sections.
Interestingly, the above provides us with a type of majority operator (see (Maj) in Section 2). In fact, adding
K5 ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r
to the four previous knowledge bases triplicates the information in K1, K2, or K5, respectively. Now, merging the
five knowledge bases as above gives us in addition to p ∧ q also r , which corresponds to the information contained
in K1, K2, and K5. More generally, given m knowledge bases, then merging with sets of equivalences of form (2)
where n > m2 satisfies a form of the majority principle. For instance, consider K1 = Cn(p) and K2 = Cn(¬p). While
merging ({K1}+m unionsq {K2}) gives Cn() for every m > 0 for both belief set merging and projection in Section 3, under
the above “majority” operator, we obtain K1 as the merge of ({K1}+m unionsq {K2}) for m > 1.
4.2. Prioritised merging
Often sources of knowledge are not equally reliable. This is not necessarily an absolute criterion in the sense that
one source is generally more reliable than another one, but rather a matter of expertise in the sense that one source is
more authoritative on certain subjects, while on others roles may well be interchanged. So for instance, if you want
to gather information for an upcoming journey, you might want to prefer (in case of conflict) the weather information
from one site and the public transport information from another, although both sites provide information on both
topics.
In our setting, this amounts to attributing to sources different priorities on different parts of the alphabet, the idea
being that such a part defines the language of a certain subject. For implementing this, we can take advantage of
approaches to preference handling in consistency-based reasoning. Among them, let us follow the one of preferred
subtheories [4] because of its appealing simplicity.
To begin with, consider a family of knowledge bases (Kj )j∈J . We express the priorities among these knowledge
bases with respect to different subjects by means of a hierarchy on the alphabets PJ : A hierarchy associated with a
family of knowledge bases (Kj )j∈J is a strict n-ary partition of
⋃
j∈J Pj for n > 0. That is, if (P1, . . . ,Pn) is such a
hierarchy, we have
⋃
1in Pi =
⋃
j∈J Pj and Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ for 1 i, j  n. Intuitively, items in Pi are preferred to
those Pj whenever i < j . That is, for example, q1 ∈ P5 and q2 ∈ P7 reflects the idea that the contents of knowledge
base K5 regarding q is considered more reliable than that in K7.
Now, we can use the information in a hierarchy to guide the formation of a maximal set of equivalences. We do
this in the context of projected merging, since, as above, this type of merging is more easily parameterizable than
symmetric merging.
Definition 4.1. Let H = (P1, . . . ,Pn) be a hierarchy associated with the family of knowledge bases (Kj )j∈J .
Define EQ as an H -maximal set of equivalences, if EQ =⋃1in EQi and for all k such that 1 k  n we have
that
⋃
1ik EQi is a maximal set of equivalences
⋃
1ik
EQi ⊆
{
pj ≡ p | p ∈ P, j ∈ J, and pj ∈
⋃
1ik
P i
}
such that
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ R ∪
⋃
1ik
EQi
)
∩ (C ∪ {⊥})= ∅.
Then
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ R ∪ EQ
)
∩LP
is a consistent H -projected belief change extension of B .
If there is no such set EQ then B is inconsistent and LP is defined to be the sole (inconsistent) H -projected belief
change extension of B .
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As an example, let us reconsider the knowledge bases from Example 2:
K1 ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ s and K2 ≡ ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬s.
Suppose that the first analyst is more competent on stocks p and q , while the second is more qualified for stocks r
and s. This can be modeled through the following hierarchy:
H = ({p1, q1, r2, s2},{p2, q2, r1, s1}).
We get a single H -projected belief change extension being equivalent to p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬s.
Interestingly, this hierarchical form of merging can be put in correspondence to revision, and this in a different way
than done in the previous section. Assume that we are given two consistent formulas,10 K1 and K2 over alphabet P .
Then, the revision of K1 by K2, that is, K1 +˙ K2, corresponds to the H -projected merge of K1 and K2 with respect
to hierarchy H = ({p1 | p ∈P}, {p2 | p ∈P}).
Sometimes it is desirable that knowledge bases remain neutral with respect to certain propositions. Consider where
we have knowledge bases K1 and K2 and alphabet {p,q, r}. K1 is trusted more wrt p, and K2 is trusted more wrt q ,
but neither is preferred wrt r . Having the hierarchy ({p1, q2, r1, r2}, {p2, q1}), for instance, does not capture this since
it ranks r1, r2 wrt p2, q1. Arguably the partition should be ({p1, q2}, {p2, q1}), which less constrains the possible EQ
sets. This can be accommodated as follows. A hierarchy is only defined on a certain subset of PJ . Let N contain
the non-ranked propositions, that is,
⋃
j∈J Pj = N ∪
⋃
1in Pi . Then, it is sufficient to replace pj ∈
⋃
1ik P
i in
Definition 4.1 by pj ∈⋃1ik P i ∪ N in order to obtain the desired result.
Finally, let us mention that our way of ranking can also be used to put priorities on general formulas. If K1 is to be
trusted over K2 wrt φ, then one needs just introduce a new atom pφ , along with assertion (or new integrity constraint)
(pφ ≡ φ), and then assert that K1 is to be trusted over K2 wrt pφ .
5. Complexity
In [9], we analysed the computational complexity of reasoning from belief change scenarios. Specifically, we
addressed the following basic reasoning tasks:
Theorem 5.1. [9]
(1) Deciding whether a belief change scenario B has a consistent belief change extension is NP-complete;
(2) Given a belief change scenario B and formula φ, deciding whether φ is contained in at least one consistent belief
change extension of B is 2P -complete; and
(3) Given a belief change scenario B and formula φ, deciding whether φ is contained in all consistent belief change
extensions of B is 2P -complete.
Clearly, the variants of these decision problems for merging and projection fall in the same complexity class
and in fact follow as corollaries of the above result. This then illustrates an advantage of formulating belief change
operations within a uniform framework: essentially, properties of the basic framework can be investigated in a general
form; properties of specific operators (or combinations of operators) are then easily derivable as secondary results.
6. Discussion
We have presented a general consistency-based framework for specifying belief set merging operators. Two major
approaches for merging belief sets were developed. In the first approach, the intuition is that for merging belief sets,
common information is in a sense “pooled”. This approach then seems to conform to the commonsense notion of
merging of knowledge, in which belief sets are joined to produce a single belief set retaining as much as possible
10 Or indeed sets of formulas.
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belief sets are in the merged belief set.
In the second approach, belief sets are projected onto another belief set. That is, the sets we wish to merge are used
to augment the knowledge of another (possibly empty) belief set. This second approach appears to differ from others
that have appeared in the literature. It is strictly weaker than the first; however this weakness is not a disadvantage,
since, among other things, it avoids the possible difficulty illustrated in Example 2. This second approach has some-
thing of the flavour of both belief revision and update. With respect to belief revision, projection can be viewed as a
process whereby several belief sets are simultaneously revised with respect to another. With respect to belief update,
semantically, individual models of a belief set are independently updated. Hence projection is like update, but where
the “granularity” of the operation is at the level of belief sets rather than models. Thus projection can be regarded as
an operator lying intermediate between belief revision and update.
The role of integrity constraints was examined in these approaches. As well, we also more briefly considered
variant merging operators, including a prioritised approach to merging, wherein different knowledge sources could
within them have (relative) varying levels of reliability.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof 3.1. The statement of the theorem has R = C = ∅, which corresponds to μ =  in Definition 2.4. With μ = 
we obtain the postulates of [14], where integrity constraints are not addressed. We remain with Definition 2.4 for
uniformity with our consideration of the project operator, following.
(IC0), (IC1′), (IC2), and (IC3) are all obvious from the definition of merge.
For (IC4′), assume that K ⊥ for every K ∈K, but that there is Ki ∈K where (K) ∪ Ki  ⊥.
From Definition 3.2 we obtain that
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ EQ
)
∪ Kii  ⊥
for every set EQ satisfying the terms of the definition.
However, trivially we also have that Kii ⊆ Cn(
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪ EQ) for every set EQ satisfying the terms of the defini-
tion, and so (
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ) ∪ EQ  ⊥.
But this contradicts (IC1′), and so there is no Ki ∈K where (K) ∪ Ki  ⊥, establishing what was to be shown.
For (IC5), let K1 = (K1, . . . ,Kn) and K2 = (Kn+1, . . . ,Km).
If (K1) ∧ (K2)  ⊥ then the result is immediate; hence assume that (K1) ∧ (K2) ⊥.
Let E1 be a symmetric belief change extension of (K1,∅,∅) over P{1..n} with corresponding set of equivalences
EQ1, and let E2 be a symmetric belief change extension of (K2,∅,∅) over P{n+1..m} with corresponding set of
equivalences EQ2.
Clearly EQ1 ∪ EQ2 can be extended to a set of equivalences over P{1..m} for (K1, . . . ,Km), from which our result
follows.
That we do not obtain (IC6) follows from [15, Theorem 3.3]: a merging operator that satisfies (IC2), (IC4), and
(IC6) cannot satisfy majority independence. Since  satisfies (IC2), (IC4), and majority independence it cannot
thereby satisfy (IC6).
(IC7) and (IC8) are trivial here. 
Proof 3.2. (LS1), (LS4)′, and (LS5) are obvious.
For (LS2), if  ¬(α ∧ β) then the result is immediate.
If ¬(α∧β) then there is a unique set of equivalences determining a single belief change extension to ({α}, {β},∅)
given by EQ = {p ≡ p′ | p ∈P}. It follows in this case that (α ∧ β) ≡ (α  β). This also serves to show (LS3).
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i∈I
Cn
({α′} ∪ {β1 ∧ β2} ∪ EQi)  φ ∧ φ′
then (⋂
i∈I
Cn
({α′} ∪ {β1} ∪ EQi)
)
∪ {β2}  φ ∧ φ′.
The proof is the same as that for (K +˙ 7) in [6, Theorem 4.2].
For (LS7), we show that if  (α ∨ β) ⊃ φ for arbitrary φ, then  (α  β) ⊃ φ. If  (α ∨ β) ⊃ φ then  α ⊃ φ and
 β ⊃ φ. But we also have that  α′ ⊃ φ′ and  β ′ ⊃ φ′ and so by the definition of  we get that φ ∈ α  β and so
 α  β ⊃ φ.
(LS8) follows from the observation that if α ⊥ and β ⊥ then it is an easy consequence of the definition of 
that α  β ¬α, α  β ¬β . (See as well the proof of (IC4′) in the preceding proof.)
For (LS6c)′, assume that EQ determines symmetric belief change extension of ({α}, {β1 ∨ β2},∅), and let c be
the function that selects this belief change extension. From [6, Lemma A.1] we have that EQ determines symmetric
belief change extension of ({α}, {β1},∅) or of ({α}, {β2},∅). Assume without loss of generality that EQ determines
symmetric belief change extension of ({α}, {β1},∅), and let c′ be the function that selects this belief change extension.
We have that α c β1 is {φ | {α′} ∪ {β1} ∪ EQ  φ ∧φ′} and α c (β1 ∨β2) is {φ | {α′} ∪ {β1 ∨β2} ∪ EQ  φ ∧φ′}.
Consequently we have that α c β1 implies α c (β1 ∨ β2). 
Proof 3.3. We have that φ ∈ α  β iff for every set of equivalences EQ determining a belief change extension that
φ,φ′ ∈ Cn(α′ ∪ β ∪ EQ), where φ ∈ LP , and φ′ ∈ LP ′ .
But φ ∈ Cn(α′ ∪ β ∪ EQ), φ ∈LP for every such EQ iff φ ∈ α +˙ β .
And:
φ′ ∈ Cn(α′ ∪ β ∪ EQ) where φ′ ∈LP ′ for every such set EQ
iff φ ∈ Cn(α ∪ β ′ ∪ EQ) where φ ∈LP for every such set EQ
iff φ ∈ β +˙ α.
Consequently we have φ ∈ α  β iff φ ∈ α +˙ β and φ ∈ β +˙ α; thus α  β ≡ α +˙ β ∩ β +˙ α. 
Proof 3.4. (IC0), (IC1′), (IC2), and (IC3) are all obvious from the definition of project. (For (IC2) we would have
EQ = {pj ≡ p | p ∈P and j ∈ J } from which the result follows.)
For (IC4′), since K1  μ we have that there is a maximal set EQ defined using the language P1 such that K11 ∪
{μ} ∪ EQ is consistent. Clearly K11 ∪ K22 ∪ {μ} ∪ EQ is consistent. Consequently we can extend EQ to a maximal set
EQ′, according to Definition 3.5 over language P1 ∪P2 such that K11 ∪K22 ∪ {μ} ∪ EQ′ is consistent, from which our
result obtains.
(IC5) is the same as in Theorem 3.1, but allowing R = ∅. (IC6) fails for the same reason as in Theorem 3.1.
For (IC7), assume that ∇μ1(K) ∧ μ2 ⊥ (otherwise our result holds trivially).
We have for every choice of EQ satisfying Definition 3.5 that
∇μ1c (K) ∧ μ2 = Cn
((
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ {μ1} ∪ EQ
)
∩LP
)
∪ {μ2}
)
= Cn
((
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ {μ1} ∪ EQ ∪ {μ2}
)
∩LP
))
= Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ {μ1,μ2} ∪ EQ
)
∩LP
= ∇μ1∧μ2c (K).
(IC8) holds, given the consistency condition, by virtue of the fact that we have equalities in the preceding. 
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For (LS6), the counterexample is (writing conjunction by juxtaposition and giving conjunction higher precedence
than disjunction):
α is pqrs, β1 is ¬p¬q ∨ ¬r, β1 is ¬q ∨ ¬s.
α  (β1 ∨ β2) is pqrs  (¬q ∨ ¬r ∨ ¬s) which is p ∧ (qrs ∨ ¬qrs ∨ q¬rs ∨ qr¬s).
α  β1 is pqrs  (¬p¬q ∨ ¬r) which is s ∧ (pqr ∨ ¬pqr ∨ p¬qr ∨ pq¬r ∨ ¬p¬qr).
α  β2 is pqrs ∨ (¬q ∨ ¬s) which is pr ∧ (qs ∨ ¬qs ∨ q¬s).
(LS8)′ follows from the observation that if α ⊥ and β ⊥ then it is an easy consequence of the definition of  that
α  β  ¬α. That is, one can choose an initial EQ set by: EQ = {p ≡ p1 | p ∈ P}. The satisfiability of α guarantees
that α ∪ EQ is satisfiable. EQ can subsequently be extended to a maximum set satisfying Definition 3.5, from which
our result follows. 
Proof 3.6. Let B = (K,∅,∅) be a multi belief change scenario. Toward showing that ∇(K) ⊆ (K), choose α ∈ LP
such that α /∈ (K). We show that α /∈ (K), as follows.
Since α /∈ (K), by Definition 3.3 there is some maximal set of equivalences EQ and an index i such that
Cn(
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪ EQ) ∩ {⊥} = ∅ and αi /∈ Cn(
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪ EQ).
Define
EQ′ = EQ ∪ {pi ≡ p | p ∈P},
EQ∗ = EQ′ ∪ {pj ≡ p | EQ′  pj ≡ p where p ∈P and j ∈ J},
EQ+ = EQ∗ \ {pj ≡ pk | pj ≡ pk ∈ EQ, p ∈P and j, k ∈ J}.
Clearly
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ EQ′
)
∩ {⊥} = ∅ and
Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ EQ∗
)
∩ {⊥} = 0.
As well, we have Cn(EQ∗) = Cn(EQ+).
We have that EQ+ satisfies the conditions for a maximal set of equivalences according to Definition 3.6. The
argument is as follows:
– We had originally that Cn(
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪EQ)∩{⊥} = ∅ is a maximal set of equivalences according to Definition 3.3.
– As mentioned, Cn(
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪ EQ′)∩ {⊥} = ∅ (since the added equivalences in EQ′ involve a new language, viz.
P), and Cn(⋃j∈J Kjj ∪ EQ∗) ∩ {⊥} = ∅ (since EQ∗ simply includes derivable equivalences).
– From Cn(EQ∗) = Cn(EQ+) we get that Cn(EQ+) determines a maximal set of equivalences according to Defini-
tion 3.6.
Now let M be a model of
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪ EQ such that M |= αi , and let M ′ be its extension to a model of
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪
EQ′.
It follows from the preceding that M ′ is a model of
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪ EQ+.
But this means that M ′ |= α given the equivalences in EQ′, which are retained in EQ+.
Thus we have that M ′ is a model of
⋃
j∈J K
j
j ∪EQ+, M ′ |= α, and EQ+ determines a maximal set of equivalences
according to Definition 3.6.
Consequently α /∈ ∇(K), which was to be shown. 
Proof 3.7. This is an easy consequence of Definitions 2.2 and 3.6. 
476 J.P. Delgrande, T. Schaub / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 459–477Proof 3.8. Note that Definition 3.7 extends Definition 3.5 by the addition of the term
(A.1){pk ≡ pl | p ∈ P and k, l ∈ J}
in the specification of EQ.
Let EQ be a set of equivalences according to the given conditions in Definition 3.5. For convenience, let
Γ = Cn
(⋃
j∈J
K
j
j ∪ R ∪ EQ
)
.
Assume that Γ ⊥; otherwise our result follows trivially.
We prove the result by showing that for every pk = pl , k, l ∈ J , either Γ  pk ≡ pl or Γ  ¬(pk ≡ pl). That is,
the extra term (A.1) in the definition of EQ in Definition 3.7 is in fact redundant.
Let EQ be a set of equivalences according to Definition 3.5. Let p ∈ P . For j, k ∈ J we have the following
possibilities:
(1) pj ≡ p ∈ EQ and pk = p ∈ EQ.
We have that EQ  pj ≡ pk and so from the monotonicity of classical logic we obtain Γ  pj = pk .
(2) pj ≡ p ∈ EQ and pk = p /∈ EQ.
By assumption we have that Γ  ⊥ and from the maximality of EQ we have that Γ ∪ {pk ≡ p}  ⊥. Hence
Γ  ¬(pk ≡ p), and since by assumption we have that Γ  pj ≡ p we obtain that Γ  ¬(pk ≡ pj ).
(3) pj ≡ p /∈ EQ and pk ≡ p ∈ EQ.
This is the same as case 2 above.
(4) pj ≡ p /∈ EQ and pk ≡ p /∈ EQ.
From the maximality of EQ we have that Γ ∪ {pj ≡ p}  ⊥ and Γ ∪ {pk ≡ p}  ⊥. Thus Γ  ¬(pj ≡ p) and
Γ  ¬(pk ≡ p) from which we obtain that Γ  pk ≡ pj .
This shows that for every pk ≡ pl , k, l ∈ J , either Γ  pk ≡ pl or Γ  ¬(pk ≡ pl), which was to be shown. 
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